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Abstract
Cyber-security is an ever-increasing problem in the 21st century. Though the majority of
cyber-security breaches are a direct result of human error (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012),
there is a dearth of research in psychology on the application of human decision-making for
cyber-security compliance. Through an online inbox simulation, the present research examined
the utility of a robust psychological model for decision-making, signal detection theory (SDT)
for modeling decision-making in the context of receiving and responding to phishing and spearphishing email scams. The influence of individual differences, specifically conscientiousness, on
phishing email detection was also examined. The results indicate that SDT is useful for modeling
and measuring cyber-compliance behavior in terms of responding to phishing emails. This
finding supports the feasibility of using SDT to monitor training effectiveness for individuals’
resistance to social engineering in phishing email detection. There were no significant
relationships between participants’ scores on conscientiousness and their phishing and spearphishing email detection ability. Future research should explore predictors of cyber-compliance
with regards to individuals’ phishing and spear-phishing susceptibility.
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Chapter One
Introduction
As Dalal et al. (2010) pointed out, research on the decision-making process is imperative
for those in the field of Industrial-Organizational (I-O) Psychology. Decisions drive human
behavior in the workplace and are therefore centric to many of the areas of study for I-O
researchers. Some decision-making approaches borrow from behavioral economics and examine
the influence of human perceptions of risks and rewards associated with certain decision
outcomes. Research ranges from modeling the processes through which individuals choose
decision-making strategies (Beach & Mitchell, 1978) to evaluating the underpinnings of
cognitive shortcuts, or heuristics, used in decision-making (Kahneman, 2011).
One persistent finding in the decision-making literature is that humans do not always act
in their best interests (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Sometimes their perceptions are skewed (or
biased) about what the consequences of a decision might be; in other instances, they might fail to
recognize the problems all together. Human performance resulting from these decisions is the
subject of many different streams of research across various applications. A recent application of
the errors in human decision-making exists in study of cyber-security behaviors (Guo, 2013).
That is, human errors in recognizing the cost of certain consequences of their actions related to
cyber-security issues (falling prey to social engineering, failing to create strong passwords, etc.)
are pervasive. This misjudgment frequently exposes vulnerabilities in organizations’ cybersecurity, which leaves organizations susceptible to cyber-attacks. These errors are critical as
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recent research suggests that over half of successful cyber-attacks are due to human error, not the
result of inadequate technology (Hu et al., 2012).
However, the current literature falls short in incorporating human factors (e.g. decisionmaking) in examining common cyber-attacks, such as phishing (El-Din, Cairns, & Clark, 2015).
Specifically, there is a lack of empirical and experimental research in this area. We know that
employees represent serious threats to cyber-security, but just how susceptible are employees to
cyber-threats? Are certain threats easier for employees to detect? Are there individual differences
that cause some employees to be more susceptible than others? The present research will address
the dearth of research on these human factors relevant to cyber-security vulnerabilities and,
additionally, contribute to the overarching research in I-O psychology on cyber-security.
The present research uses a psychological framework to model human error in decisionmaking in order to better understand cyber-security issues. First, a review of the organizational
context of performance in I-O psychology is presented in order to provide a basis for the
importance of the present work. Next, current cyber-security issues are discussed in order to
build a foundation for the subsequent section on the application of cyber-security issues to
decision-making within the I-O framework. Finally, components specific to the present research
are detailed and the utilization of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) for modeling cyber-security
decisions is presented. Through this lens, employers have the opportunity to take measures for
the prevention of employee non-compliance behaviors. Moreover, there exists the potential to
impact behavior and increase employee compliance with cyber-security behaviors (Wiederhold,
2014). As such, the application of cyber-security issues to the intersection of decision-making
and I-O psychology has direct implications for national security, organizations of all types, and
the individuals they employ.
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Organizational Context
In I-O psychology, much research is devoted to figuring out how to predict and improve
job performance through identifying individual differences that are associated with a difference
in job performance (e.g. Dalal, 2005; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Though some researchers think
of job performance as a unitary concept that broadly encompasses employee behaviors that are
relevant to the goals of the organization, research, however, suggests that there are multiple
components to job performance and that performance should be considered from a
multidimensional perspective. Campbell, Gasser, and Oswald (1996) suggested job performance
is a multidimensional construct and split the criterion into declarative knowledge, procedural
knowledge, and motivation. Then, Viswesvaran and Ones (2000) found that job performance
could be conceptualized as a hierarchy with a general factor at the primary level followed by
various dimensions underneath. Currently, researchers conceptualize job performance as having
three main components: task performance, counterproductive work behavior, and organizational
citizenship behavior. Job performance is separated into these categories on the basis that the
behaviors associated with each category either contribute to, or detract from, organizational goals
for different reasons (Motowildo, Borman, & Schmit, 1997).
Task performance is composed of what has been traditionally considered job
performance. Specifically, task performance consists of the core job behaviors, those that
directly contribute to the “technical core” of organizational goals. Often, behaviors associated
with task performance are outlined in the occupation’s job description. The individual
differences that best predict task performance are differences in cognitive ability. Higher scores
on tests that measure cognitive ability (e.g. SAT, GRE, etc.) are associated with better task
performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Borman and Motowidlo (1993) introduced
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organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), or contextual performance, as another type of
performance that is separate from task performance because the associated behaviors do not
contribute directly to the technical core of the organization, but rather, they are prosocial
behaviors that contribute to the organizational environment. OCBs are also more discretionary
than task performance behaviors. Being positive and cooperating with coworkers are rarely
behaviors that are considered a job requirement. Still, such prosocial behaviors are associated
with general job performance. Individual differences in personality best predict contextual
performance or OCBs.
Since for the majority of employees (with the exception of those involved in computer
security), cyber-security compliance (i.e., inappropriate response to phishing emails) is not a
requirement of their job, it therefore aligns with the OCB dimension of job performance. It
would follow that personality differences should predict this contextual performance. Still, there
are mixed results from studies looking at the relationship between personality traits and phishing
susceptibility (Parrish Jr, Bailey, & Courtney, 2009). The subsequent section will explore the
importance of cyber-security compliance within the organizational context.
Current Issues in Cyber-Security
Cyber-security is receiving increased attention from the public. Between the widely
publicized cyber-attacks at Sony, JP Morgan, Target, and more recently, the US Government’s
Office of Personnel Management, it is difficult for the average US citizen to ignore news of
current threats to information security. The cost of simply cleaning up and remediating the
company’s affected servers is astronomical. For instance, a cyber-attack recently cost Sony $171
million and this figure is excluding costs associated with lawsuits, loss of customers, etc.
(Rosenbush, 2014). Moreover, it is not only large organizations that are affected by cyber-
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attacks. Ransomware is currently a popular cyber-attack that plagues small businesses. A
ransomware attack involves hackers denying an organization access to information, files, or even
smart appliances (e.g. refrigerators) until a sum of money is paid. Across both large corporations
and small organizations, the average cost of a cyber-security breach is $412,000 per incident
(Major, 2014). Given these increasingly widespread attacks, the federal government is investing
billions of dollars in boosting cyber-security defenses (Shalal & Selyukh, 2015).
In addition to the financial concerns, a breach represents a grave crisis for the
organization’s public relations. CyberAlert (www.cyberalert.com) highlighted that organizations
struggle to recuperate from the unfavorable company image resulting from breaches due to the
tendency for reporters to mark trends in cyber-security breaches. That is, when news of another
breach occurs, reporters echo previously reported breaches as well. Though the public tends to
view these instances as a result of inadequate technologies, organizations’ vulnerabilities lie not
only in their hardware and software defenses, but also in the individual vulnerabilities of the
organizations’ employees. The typical employee will engage in many behaviors, often
unknowingly, that pose cyber-security risks for themselves and their employing organizations.
For instance, it is common for employees to engage in behaviors, such as creating simple, easyto-remember passwords like sequential numbers (e.g. “1234”) or, oftentimes “password.” Thus,
cyber-security negligence poses insider threats that can result in the loss of revenue, reputation,
and intellectual property.
There are several advantages to investigating the human side of cyber-security along with
the technical aspects. First, as aforementioned, the reality is that the majority of information
security breaches result from employee behaviors (Hu et al., 2012). Second, as a consequence of
the exponential growth of technology, the information about technical defenses that students
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learn will likely be obsolete by the time they graduate and enter the workforce. Echoing this
sentiment, Gelernter (2015) stated “University computer science departments are in miserable
shape: 10 years behind in a field that changes every 10 minutes.” On the other hand, human
behavior is much more constant. Thus, the argument can be made that, contrary to technical
defenses, defenses construed by an understanding of employee behavior in the context of cybersecurity compliance will hold through evolutions of cyber-attacks. Finally, as the subsequent
section highlights, it is evident that criminals have not only already recognized the role of human
behavior in creating vulnerabilities in an organization’s system, but also created attacks centered
on exploiting these human vulnerabilities.
The method through which criminals target known characteristics of human behavior and
traits in order to gain access to sensitive information is called social engineering (Winkler &
Dealy, 1995). Specifically, hackers take advantage of human trust to reveal sensitive information
from the users by pretending to be legitimate members of the company, and thus, targeting the
trust employees have in their coworkers, bosses, etc. For instance, one social engineering
technique, called baiting, involves the infecting of USBs with computer viruses and scattering
them across a parking lot. The social engineers preyed on the curiosity of employees in this
example, knowing that some of them would insert the devices into their work computers, at
which point, the login credentials of such employees would be recorded by a keylogger on the
USB. Employees at Secure Network Technologies, Inc. found that when 20 USBs were
dispersed in a clients’ company parking lot, within just three days, employees had collected and
used fifteen of these USBs (Stasiukonis, 2006).
Characteristics of social engineering that work to the hackers advantage include: the lack
of use of high-end technologies, methods that are very easy for someone with low information
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technology (IT) expertise to implement, and the vulnerability of end-users to these tactics. For
instance, in the aforementioned baiting example, Stasiukonis (2006) emphasized the
“convenience” of the tactic, stating that the technicians “never broke a sweat.” Effortlessness
paired with a seventy-five percent success rate must make an attractive method for criminals!
The widespread success and use of social engineering accentuates the fact that the
firewalls and security measures companies invest in are worthless if employees leave the door
wide open for hackers and social engineers to enter. The reason all end-users are vulnerable to
social engineering is due to the fact that the tactics utilize known characteristics (e.g., biases) of
human nature to ensure success. Thus, if criminals use the psychological manipulation of endusers to gain sensitive information, it follows that tenants of psychology would also be useful in
the detection and prevention of insider threat.
Phishing
Phishing email attacks are a common form of social engineering designed to influence
recipients to open file attachments or click on embedded links that create vulnerabilities for
hackers to exploit in order to gain access to sensitive information (Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson,
& Menczer, 2007). Like baiting tactics, phishing provides social engineers with a low risk and
low effort method that can yield great financial gains (Chandrasekaran, Narayanan, &
Upadhyaya, 2006).
Social engineers typically conduct phishing attacks using a three-step process
(Chandrasekaran et al., 2006). First, they decide on a business to target and collect the email
addresses of potential customers or employees for that business, often using the same techniques
that spammers use to collect victims’ email addresses. Second, the cyber criminals design and
send out the emails scams (considered the “hook” of phishing attacks) in mass quantities to the
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collected addresses. These emails either have links embedded in them that will direct the victims
to an illegitimate website or they have an attachment that when downloaded will infect the
victims’ devices. In the final step of the process, the social engineers collect credentials from
victims (the “catch” from the phishing attack). When victims click on the embedded links and
enter their information on the illegitimate websites, their information is stored for the social
engineers’ use. Alternatively, the criminals gain access to the victims’ devices through a virus
transmitted to the end-user’s computer through executable email attachments, at which point,
criminals can access financial or otherwise sensitive information of the victims that can result in
various personal or organizational costs.
A typical phishing method is creating emails that mimic banks, credit card companies, or
other business that involve monetary transfer (e.g., eBay). There are several different
components (or “lures”) involved in phishing attacks that incentivize end-users to expose their
sensitive information (see Appendix C for examples). The 2012 US-CERT Security Trends
Report lists the most common lure themes as business logistical operations (i.e., packaging and
shipping), financials (i.e., tax information), customer complaint claims, and travel (United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team, 2012).
Spear-phishing
Another cyber-security threat involves a tactic called spear-phishing, which is, as its
name suggests, a more targeted form of phishing aimed at attacking specific individuals within
an organization instead of the organization itself. Through this method, cyber criminals
commonly impersonate trusted users and personalize messages for a more sophisticated and
elaborate social engineering technique (see Appendix D for examples). Hong (2012) noted an
example of spear-phishing in which a military official would be sent an invitation for a general’s
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retirement party containing malicious links or attachments. In instances such as this, cyber
criminals exploit specific information (often obtained through social networking sites) about the
targeted end-users in order to gain access to their personal information. Understanding individual
differences in employees’ decision-making processes regarding these risky behaviors will inform
organizations of ways to maximize employee compliance with cyber-security policies and ward
off such attacks. Before understanding the nature of the relationship between individual
differences and cyber-security compliance, it is essential to define cyber-security compliance as
a criterion.
Measuring Cyber-Security Compliance
Though there exist numerous studies on phishing susceptibility, there is a lack of
consistency in measurement techniques. Parrish et al. (2009) defined phishing susceptibility
along two dimensions: 1) the likelihood that an individual will respond to a phishing email (offer
his/her information) and 2) the time it takes for the individual to respond to the email.
Susceptibility varies along the time continuum because the greater the amount of time after the
phishing email is distributed, the smaller the probability that an individual will fall victim
(Jagatic et al., 2007). Janet, Mitchell, Robert, and Bradley (2008) used 12 items detailing “risky
behaviors” related to phishing emails to collect survey data on student phishing susceptibility.
Vishwanath (2015) used a dichotomous measure of susceptibility, recording whether or not
participants clicked a hyperlink in a phishing email that was sent to subjects. Sheng, Holbrook,
Kumaraguru, Cranor, and Downs (2010) used a more conservative measure, only recording the
number of participants that gave their information in response to a phishing email.
One issue with the measures of susceptibility reviewed above is that none of them take
into account expectancy factors. That is, researchers were unable to parse out whether the
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susceptibility was due to misestimating the risk associated with falling for phishing scams or
simply an individual’s ability to detect phishing scams. In the present experiment, signal
detection theory (SDT) will be utilized to measure performance in detecting cyber-threats in
emails. Signal detection theory includes biases such as expectations of risk in the mathematical
model of the response process (Anderson, 2001). Lord (1985) made an argument for the
improvement of behavioral measurement in applied psychology through the utilization of SDT,
noting the superior operationalization for experimental studies and the availability of
improvements for accuracy as the primary benefits. As both a model of decision-making and an
analytical tool, the theory represents a strong measure for threat detection performance within the
context of this experiment. The subsequent section provides an overview of the SDT model and
framework.
Signal Detection Theory
SDT is a commonly employed model for describing decision-making cognition.
Particularly, SDT is useful for mapping decision-making in conditions of uncertainty. At its
simplest form, SDT measures a decision-maker’s ability to discriminate between two stimuli,
that is to detect when a signal is present versus when there is no signal present—such as
distinguishing between a tone versus background noise (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). A
knowledge of the underpinnings of the model allows researchers to quantify the decision-making
process and, moreover, to influence the decision-maker in order to optimize performance. This
section provides a brief historical background of SDT, an overview of the current model, and a
discussion of current and potential applications of SDT.
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Background
SDT has a long, rich history and is sometimes considered one of the sources of cognitive
psychology (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). Radar researchers first introduced the framework
for the model in the 1950s within the context of air traffic control (Marcum, 1947; Peterson,
Birdsall, & Fox, 1954). Air traffic controllers have to detect, based on radar images on their
screen, aircrafts that need to be monitored. The difficulty lies in the copious amounts of “ground
clutter” or unwanted echoes in that are returned from things such as animals and atmospheric
turbulence that make it more difficult to distinguish echoes that represent the target (an aircraft)
versus noise (clutter). Peterson et al. (1954) provided a method for quantifying the ability to
distinguish between targets and noise. The researchers outlined four distinct outcomes to any
given decision: correct detection, correct rejection, miss, and false alarm. In the case of the air
traffic controllers, they could correctly recognize an incoming plane (correct detection), correctly
recognize that a flock of birds is not a plane (correct rejection), incorrectly perceive a plane to be
a flock of birds (miss), or incorrectly perceive a flock of birds to be a plane (false alarm).
After early radar researchers (Marcum, 1947; Peterson et al., 1954) provided the
inception of the idea of quantifying the ability to discern between signal and noise, cognitive
researchers (Green & Swets, 1966; Tanner Jr & Swets, 1954) swiftly adapted this framework to
fit the context of human decision-making. Much of their research stemmed from threshold
theory, which is a probabilistic model of decision-making proposed in the 1800s. Threshold
theory proved insufficient for modeling signal detection because its probabilistic nature caused
the computed statistics to be variant to changes other than sensitivity (Macmillan & Creelman,
2004). Threshold measures varied within person from trial to trial, even if the same stimulus was
used across observations. To address this limitation, Green and Swets (1966) developed the
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framework for SDT. This framework is advantageous over threshold theory because the latter
proved unsuccessful at separating the influence of the sensitivity and response bias, whereas
SDT uses a flexible decision criterion that accommodates variation in components of the model
other than sensitivity (described below; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2004).
Signal Detection Theory Model
Visual representation facilitates the explanation of signal detection theory. As such, this
section uses Figure 1 to depict a model of signal detection theory. Two normal distributions
represent the probabilities the occurrence of two different events (signal and noise, and noise
alone). The criterion (labeled neutral criterion in Figure 1 and commonly denoted by β)
represents the cutoff point for the decision. That is, on the right side of the criterion, the person
would decide to respond as if the signal were present while on the left side of the criterion, the
person would decide to respond as if there were no signal present. The area under the two curves
represents the four different possible outcomes (outlined in Table 1) to responding to one of the
two events. On the left side of the criterion, where the decision-maker responds as if there is no
signal, the individual would either make a correct rejection or miss the signal that was present
(miss). Likewise, on the right side of the criterion, where the decision-maker responds as if there
is a signal, he or she would either correctly detect the signal (hit) or respond when there was no
signal present (false alarm).

Table 1. The four outcomes of a decision, according to signal detection theory.

Signal Present
Signal Absent

Respond “Absent”
Miss
Correct rejection
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Respond “Present”
Hit
False Alarm

Criterion. The decision-maker’s biases determine the placement of the criterion (the
vertical line in Figure 1 labeled Neutral criterion). That is, the criterion might move away from
neutral toward the left if the decision-maker believes there is a greater cost to missing a signal
than to responding to a signal that is not present. For instance, radar detectors in a warzone
would likely perceive there to be a greater cost to missing an enemy plane than to mistaking a
flock of birds for a plane. The shift of the criterion to the left represents a liberal bias.
Alternatively, the criterion might shift right of the neutral position (a conservative bias) when the
decision-maker perceives a greater cost to responding to a signal that is not present.

Figure 1. Model of signal detection theory.

D-prime. D-prime (d′) is the most commonly used sensitivity index for SDT (Green &
Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). d′ represents the sensitivity of the decision-maker
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to detection of the signal, where high sensitivity indicates a good ability to distinguish between
signal and noise and low sensitivity indicated a poor ability (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). That
is, a high d′ would indicate that a radar detector is more sensitive to detecting the difference
between a plane and a flock of birds. Mathematically, d′ measures the distance between the zscore of the hit rate and the z-score of the false alarm rate and, thus, is a measure of the
standardized difference between the proportion of hits and the proportion of false alarms
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). Moreover, d′ can be conceptualized as the differences between
the noise and the signal and noise distributions (see Figure 1). This means that the smaller the d′,
the more overlap there is between the two events and the more difficult they are to distinguish.
Alternatively, with greater distance between the two means (larger d′), it becomes easier for the
decision-maker to distinguish between the signal and noise. Consequently, the similarity of the
two events affects the size of d′.
ROC curve. Another component of SDT is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve (see Figure 2). ROC curves plot the hit rate that would be obtained for every value of false
alarm rate, given a certain d′ value. When d′ is equal to zero, it indicated that performance is at
chance level, or the decision-maker has no ability to distinguish between the two signals (this is
depicted by the line labeled “d′ = 0” in Figure 2). As the ability for the decision-maker to
distinguish between the two signals increases, the curves shift toward the upper left corner,
where accuracy is maximized, or the hit rate is always greater than or equal to the false-alarm
rate (labeled “d′ = 3” in Figure 2). ROC is typically calculated “by asking participants to supply
confidence ratings for their recognition memory decisions” (Wixted, 2007, p. 153).
Payoff and base rate. Two other important components of SDT are payoff and base rate.
Payoff is the evaluation of the costs and benefits of each decision (see Table 1). Correct
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detections and correct rejections result in benefits to the decision-maker, while false alarms and
missed detections result in costs to the decision-maker (Lynn & Barrett, 2014). Base rate is the
probability of encountering signals relative to noise (Lynn & Barrett, 2014). As such, payoff and
base rate influence the participant’s criterion placement or bias.

Figure 2. ROCs for SDT on linear coordinates.*
*The closer the curve gets to the upper left corner, the higher the d′ value and the greater the
accuracy.
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Important developments in SDT involve studies that considered the manipulation of base
rate and payoff. Understanding the manipulation of payoff and base rate is important because it
could lead the decision-maker to set the criterion closer the optimal placement where accuracy
would be maximized. Healy and Kubovy (1981) conducted an influential study that manipulated
each base rate and payoff for participants who were asked to decide whether given values
reflected the heights of men or women. The researchers found that base rates had a greater
influence on the participants’ criterion placement than payoff (Healy & Kubovy, 1981). Another
important contribution was the support for the independence of the influences of base rate and
payoff information on criterion placement (Bohil & Maddox, 2001; Stevenson, Busemeyer, &
Naylor, 1991).
It is worth mentioning that, while the normal-distribution model of SDT discussed thus
far is the most commonly used; there are other ways to model SDT (Macmillan & Creelman,
2004). Namely, two other ways are threshold theory, discussed in the background section, and
one-interval experiments, which broadens the detection framework to include situations that
involve more than two different stimuli or more than two different response types (Macmillan &
Creelman, 2004).
Applications of Signal Detection Theory
Traditional applications of signal detection theory involve the radar operators’ application
(Marcum, 1947), which sparked the development of the theory and cognitive psychology
applications (see Green & Swets, 1966; Pazzaglia, Dube, & Rotello, 2013). Currently, SDT is
used widely across many fields. For instance, the medical field utilizes SDT to model diagnostics
(Lusted, 1971) and alarm fatigue for nurses (Despins, Scott‐Cawiezell, & Rouder, 2010).
Another application of SDT is found in detecting management fraud in the field of auditing
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(Karim & Siegel, 1998). In the I-O psychology field, Baker and Schuck (1975) used signal
detection theory to model rater accuracy in performance assessment for a simulated sales task.
Moreover, the researchers found that, through the model, they were able to manipulate rater
accuracy in a predictable way by varying base rate and payoff. Similarly, Lievens and Sanchez
(2007) used d′ from SDT as a measure of rater accuracy for competency inferences in order to
examine then influence of rater training.
Signal Detection Theory and Cyber-Security
Lynn and Barrett’s (2014) recent paper advocates for the application of signal detection
theory (SDT) through a utility approach that incorporates behavioral economics principles
instead of the traditional analytic method. In this way, SDT can be used to predict or explain
behavior in decision-making. Lynn and Barrett (2014) mention the applicability of SDT to
eyewitnesses’ identification of suspects, decisions to place children in foster homes, and cancer
detection. In their paper, the authors specifically apply SDT to social-threat detection in
evaluating whether a person is angry or not, based on the extent to which their face appears to be
scowling. Thus, Lynn and Barrett (2014) advocate for the broadening of application of signal
detection theory to wider range of disciplines through a utility approach.
I argue principles from signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966) can measure
how susceptible employees are to cyber-threats by disentangling employee decision-making.
Thus, I explored potential applications of the SDT framework for measuring and modeling
employee cyber-security compliance. SDT is particularly useful for studying decision-making in
environments with perceptual uncertainty and risk. Uncertainty occurs when signals are difficult
to discriminate from noise. For example, suppose an employee receives an email from the human
resources department asking for his or her login information, and the employee is unsure whether
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the email is legitimate or if it is a spear-phishing email. Risk is present when incorrectly
classifying a signal as noise, and likewise classifying noise as a signal carries some cost. In this
case, if the employee decides that it is a legitimate email and responds to the email with
information, yet it actually is a phishing email, then the employee has likely cost the company
important information and/or monetary resources by granting a hacker access to the
organization’s database and servers.
In psychophysics, classical (equal-variance) SDT uses two indexes to model decisionmaking: sensitivity (d′) and response criterion (β; Green & Swets, 1966). Sensitivity (d′) reflects
a person’s ability to detect signals relative to noise. In the context of cyber-security, sensitivity is
an employee’s ability to discriminate between threats and non-threats. The response criterion
reflects biases that influence a person’s tendency to respond to a signal. The placement of the
criterion (β) is typically described as liberal, neutral, or conservative. A liberal criterion indicates
that a person would be more likely to perceive a threat in an instance where an individual with a
conservative criterion placement would perceive noise. That is, if an employee with a liberal
criterion receives a borderline suspicious email, he or she would more likely perceive the email
as a scam (or believe there is a cyber threat) than perceive the email as safe. This leads to the
first research question:
Research Question 1: Do individuals exhibit different sensitivity in detecting spearphishing and phishing emails?
Though social engineers developed spear-phishing in the hopes of increasing their cyberattack success rates, there is little empirical research comparing the difference in success rates
for spear-phishing versus phishing emails. (Hong, 2012) suggests that end-users are 4.5 times
more likely to fall prey to spear-phishing attacks than to phishing attacks. It would make sense
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that the use of social networking data to personalize the email and use existing contact
information would effectively exploit end-users’ trust and cause them to fall prey to the spearphishing attack.
On the other hand, one could make the argument that the use of private, personal
information will create a sort of cocktail party effect (Cherry, 1953), where end-users’ will attend
to the information in spear-phishing emails more carefully, as the email contains their personal
information. In this way, they will be more careful in assessing whether or not the email reflects
a threat. Thus, two competing models were proposed:
Hypothesis 1a: Individuals have a lower sensitivity to detecting a threat in a spearphishing email than a phishing email.
Hypothesis 1b: Individuals have a higher sensitivity to detecting a threat in a spearphishing email than a phishing email.
Individual Differences in Conscientiousness
I expected conscientiousness to predict phishing email sensitivity and spear-phishing
email sensitivity as it is a strong predictor of organizational citizenship behaviors or extra-task
performance that goes beyond core job performance (such as cyber-security compliance;
(Chiaburu, Oh, Berry, Li, & Gardner, 2011).
Hypothesis 2. Personality characteristics (specifically the trait of conscientiousness)
predict individual’s sensitivity to detect phishing and spear-phishing emails, such that those
higher on the conscientiousness trait will have a higher sensitivity to detect phishing and spearphishing emails.
Accompanying an understanding of human decision-making and organizational
processes, the field of I-O psychology is in a unique position to address cyber-security issues that
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result from social engineering methods. Furthermore, the nature of I-O psychologists’ work in
handling sensitive employee data presents a need for increased cyber-security knowledge of best
practices. The need for research at the intersection of psychology and cyber-security led to recent
advances in the literature on the subject (see Chen et al., 2014; Crossler et al., 2013; Steinke et
al., 2015; Willison, 2006). The present research extends the growing body of research on cybersecurity by addressing some of the critical junctures between these avenues of research through
the use of the strong psychological paradigm, SDT.
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Chapter Two
Method
Participants and Procedure
The sample consisted of 344 individuals recruited though Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) system. Although the use of MTurk for organizational research is fairly recent, there is
initial support for its use (Landers & Behrend, 2015). Out of the 344 people sampled, 282 cases
were included in the analyses because the cases had to meet several criteria for inclusion. First,
participants that failed the attention check question (10.5%) were removed. Second, participants
that spent less than 10 minutes on the survey (3.5%) were removed. Third, participants with
more than 20% of their responses missing for the email task (4.7%) were removed.
Of those participants included in the analyses, 50.2% were female and an average of
35.27 years of age (SD = 9.75). Participants worked an average of 38.7 hours per week (SD =
9.01). Almost half (43.0%) of participants had their bachelor’s degree as their highest form of
education, 33.0% had some college, 10.8% had a high school education, 7.5% had vocational
school education, 3.9% had a master’s degree, 1.1% had a professional or doctoral degree, and
0.7% had less than a high school education. Moreover, 8.5% of participants either did hold or
had held a computer security-related job.
First, participants chose the HIT (human intelligence task) from a list on the MTurk
website. They then received an anonymous link to the Qualtrics survey. They were prompted to
give consent to participate in the study by reading and acknowledging the online consent form.
The consent form also informed the participants that their compensation is contingent upon
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correctly answering questions an attention check to see if they carefully read and understood
instructions. Participants then proceeded to complete the survey, which consisted of an inbox
task, conscientiousness items, and demographics.
In order to evaluate the influence of two different types of phishing scams on decisionmaking, an inbox simulation task was created through Qualtrics. Participants were given a
prompt detailing an identity as a human resources assistant to role-play during the experiment
(see Appendix E for the prompt) and instructed to go through all the emails in their inbox and
respond to the corresponding questions. This experiment employed a 3 (type of email: no threat,
spear-phishing, or phishing email) x 2 (response: safe or unsafe) stimulus-response design. The
stimuli were presented with base rates that approximate the prevalence rate of non-threatening to
threatening emails to the extent that design constraints allowed. That is, 40 emails were created
that were non-threatening, as well as 10 emails for each the spear-phishing and phishing
categories (see Appendixes C and D for sample stimuli). I adapted these emails from real
phishing email scams provided in Cornell University’s “Phish Bowl”
(http://www.it.cornell.edu/security/phishbowl.cfm). Thus, a series of 60 trials in the form of
emails in an inbox were presented to each participant for judgment.
These emails were presented to the participants in batches of 15 emails each. Due to the
size of the email images, the survey was only available on a desktop computer (access from
mobile devices was blocked through Qualtrics). The emails were randomized within each block
to prevent order effects. The participants were not informed which emails were and were not
threatening. After reading each email, the participants were prompted with two behavioral
response options in which they would indicate how they would respond to the email. One
response option listed behaviors that are safe responses to the email (e.g. responding to the

22

sender in person), while the other response option listed behaviors that are unsafe responses (e.g.
click on a URL in the email or reply to the email). Participants then were prompted to estimate
their confidence that they would perform the chosen response given the email. Participants next
responded to items measuring conscientiousness and demographic questions. Participants were
credited $3.00 through Amazon Turk within 48 hours of survey completion. This rate was based
off of median rates offered for surveys 45 minutes in length on the MTurk site at the time of data
collection. Participants spent an average of 36.09 minutes on the survey (SD = 17.03).
Measures
Threat Detection Performance
After reading each email, the participant were prompted to answer the question “How
would you handle this email?” with one of two behavioral response options: “Option 1: Reply by
email, Download the attached file, AND/OR Click on the selected link in the email (the one that
the browser hand is pointing to)” and “Option 2: Delete the email AND/OR Contact the sender
by phone or in person.” The response information was used to calculate the d′ values for both
phishing and spear-phishing emails as a metric for threat sensitivity or threat detection
performance. More details on the calculation of this measure are provided in the analysis section
below.
Confidence ratings
After answering the threat detection question, the participant was prompted with a slider
confidence scale marked with percentages and asked, “On a scale from 0 to 100, how confident
are you that this is an appropriate response to the email? (Note: values closer to 0 indicate you
are fairly certain it is not an appropriate response and values closer to 100 indicate you are very
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certain it is an appropriate response).” This measure was used to compute the group ROCs for
analysis, as described below.
Conscientiousness
The personality trait, conscientiousness, was measured using International Personality
Item Pool’s (IPIP) 20-item scale (see Appendix A; Goldberg, 1999; Goldberg et al., 2006). The
scale had good internal consistency in this study, α = 0.95.
Demographics
There were three screening questions asking: 1) whether they have any education in
computer security, 2) whether they hold, or have held, a job involving computer security, and 3)
whether they have ever helped someone fix a computer problem (adapted from Downs,
Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006). If they answered yes to any of these questions, they were asked to
explain what they do/had done. Participants whose explanations include an indication of
knowledge of computer security, such as ethical hacking, troubleshooting, repairs, or installation
of computer systems, etc., were flagged as having security experience. Additionally, gender, age,
and ethnicity demographics were collected (see Appendix B).
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Chapter Three
Results
Modeling Phishing Email Detection
Hit rates were computed in order to make a simple comparison of participants’
performance in threat detection, or threat sensitivity, across the different types of emails (see
Table 2). This provided initial insight for the answer to research question 1. The hit rates were
higher in the spear-phishing email conditions (40.1%) than phishing email conditions (65.9%),
indicating people tend to be more accurate in detecting phishing scams than spear-phishing
scams.
Using the SDT model for classification experiment analysis (Macmillan & Creelman,
2004), sensitivity (d′) was computed for each stimulus pair. Assuming unidimensionality of the
stimuli—participants only judged the emails by the level of perceived threat—the sensitivity
between the remote stimulus pair d'(S1,S3) and the sensitivity of the adjacent stimulus pair
d'(S1,S2) was compared. In other words, the ability for participants to distinguish between no
threat and a phishing email and to distinguish between no threat and a spear-phishing email was
measured by using the hit rates and false alarm rates to compute each participant’s d' (for both
spear-phishing and phishing emails) in Excel, as detailed in Table 4 (Macmillan & Creelman,
2004; Sorkin, 1999; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).
A paired samples t-test was used as a method for testing the significance of the difference
in participants’ detection of spear-phishing (M = .42, SD = .86) and phishing emails (M = 1.10,
SD = .93). Each participant’s d′ values were used to compare means corresponding to both the
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spear-phishing and phishing stimulus pairs (d'(S1,S2) and d'(S1,S3)). The t-test indicated a
significant difference in the detection level for the two different types of emails, such that spearphishing emails were more difficult to detect; t(281) = 17.97, p <.001. That is, participants have
better threat discrimination, or higher sensitivity, with regard to phishing emails than spearphishing emails, consistent with Hypothesis 1a.
Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) analysis was utilized for further comparison of the
sensitivity of spear-phishing versus phishing emails. First, the frequency of each response
corresponding to each stimulus was computed (see Table 3). The responses were not only
divided into the two response options used for the hit rate, false alarm rate, and d′ calculations,
but the confidence ratings were used to add additional criteria, which allowed for a closer
estimation of the ROCs. The confidence ratings were dichotomized into “sure” and “unsure”
response categories based on each participants’ average confidence rating. For instance, if a
participant’s confidence rating for a spear-phishing email stimulus was 45 and their average was
60, then that confidence rating was coded as “unsure”. Participants who did not use all the
confidence ratings (for all 60 emails) were excluded from this analysis, leaving 207 participants.
On average, the participants had 87.8% confidence in their responses (SD = 10.45). The
frequency data for each stimulus-response pair are presented in Table 3. Then, in accordance
with the rating design, the frequency data was used to compute proportions for each stimulusresponse pair, transforming the data into hit and false alarm rates (see Table 5). These values
were cumulated for use in plotting the ROCs (see Table 6). The hit and false alarm rate pairs
were then used to plot the observed data points for the ROCs (see Figure 3).
Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation was used to generate signal detection theory
parameters that best fit the data (Dorfman & Alf, 1969). The parameter estimates for each model
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are displayed in Table 7. A chi-square difference test was used between the chi-square statistics
produced by the ML estimations for the ROC curve generated from the data and the constrained
model where the mean performance (d′) is assumed equal for both spear-phishing and phishing.
The difference test showed that there was a significant difference in model fit between the full
model (see Figure 3) and the constrained model (see Figure 4); χ2 = 368.35, p<.0001. Thus, both
the paired sample t-test and the ROC curve chi-square difference test supported Hypothesis 1a,
demonstrating significant individual- and group-level differences in phishing email sensitivity
and spear-phishing email sensitivity.
Individual Differences
Correlations were computed for the focal study variables and potential control variables
to examine their relationships (see Table 9). Means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis
were also computed (see Table 8). Conscientiousness (M = 78.74, SD = 15.16) was not
significantly related to phishing email sensitivity (M = 1.10, SD = .93) or spear-phishing email
sensitivity (M = .42, SD = .86); r = -.02, p > .05, r = -.02, p > .05, respectively. Income, gender,
and computer security experience were all significantly related to spear-phishing email
sensitivity and computer security experience was also significantly related to phishing email
sensitivity. Therefore, those variables were entered into the regression equations as controls to
further test Hypothesis 2. The regression results (see Table 10) indicated that conscientiousness
was not predictive of spear-phishing sensitivity (β = -.03, p > .05), even after controlling for
income (β =.12, p <.05) and computer security experience (β =.13, p <.05), which were both
significant predictors. Similarly, the regression results indicated that conscientiousness was not
predictive of phishing sensitivity (β = -.03, p > .05), even after controlling for computer security
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experience (β =.20, p <.01), which was a significant predictor. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not
supported.
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Chapter Four
Discussion
The primary purpose of the present research is to examine the applicability of the robust
psychological framework, signal detection theory, to certain cyber-security behaviors. ML
estimation of SDT parameters showed that SDT parameters fit the observed data well, meaning
that SDT parameters are useful for representing and interpreting decision-making in the context
of phishing email detection. The SDT measure for sensitivity, d′ is used as a metric of spear- and
phishing email detection performance. Consistent with prior research, both individual and group
analyses of the difference between spear-phishing detection performance and phishing detection
performance indicate that individuals are significantly more accurate at detecting phishing emails
than spear-phishing emails (c.f. Hong, 2012). This is intuitive because spear-phishing emails are
designed to target certain individuals by being more customized and thereby more persuasive.
The ability for SDT measures and parameters to capture this difference in performance denotes
the utility of SDT to model individual decision-making in the realm of cyber-security
compliance.
In an examination of the role of personality, correlation and regression analyses reveal
that conscientiousness is not significantly related to, or predictive of, phishing or spear-phishing
email detection. It is, however, possible that range restriction attenuated the relationship between
conscientiousness and phishing and spear-phishing email detection because very few individuals
scored low on conscientiousness. This could be due to the attention check that filtered out
participants based on proper reading of the instructions. Individuals who are less detail-oriented
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likely failed the attention check and subsequently were removed from analyses. Still, this finding
is inconsistent with the few studies that have examined this relationship (e.g., Hu et al., 2012;
McBride, Carter, & Warkentin, 2012). For example, Hu et al.’s (2012) research showed that with
survey responses from a sample of 148 MIS and MBA students, dutifulness—a facet of
conscientiousness—was related to intention to comply with cyber-security behaviors. McBride et
al. (2012), in a sample of 46 MBA students, similarly demonstrated that conscientiousness
significantly and negatively predicts intention to violate cyber-security policies. Perhaps sample
differences account for the difference in effect observed between these studies and the present
research as only a small percentage of the sample in this study indicated they had a master’s
level degree (3.9%). Also, the cited studies utilized business students whereas my sample was
more heterogeneous.
Moreover, Hu et al. (2012) and McBride et al. (2012) were looking more broadly at
cyber-security compliance and deviance behaviors while the present study was concerned
specifically with phishing emails. Perhaps cyber compliance and deviance are a different type of
OCB performance, while phishing and spear-phishing detection not represent a type of OCB, and
therefore are not predicted by conscientiousness. In fact, a recent study (Darwish, El Zarka, &
Aloul, 2012) similarly revealed a null effect between conscientiousness and phishing
susceptibility for 100 undergraduate students. Instead, they found that neuroticism was
significantly related to phishing susceptibility. Darwish et al. (2012) suggested that this
relationship might exist because of the relationship between individuals who score high on
neuroticism tend to have a decreased ability to detect lies. Darwish and colleagues (2012) also
found a significant relationship between openness to experience and sharing personal
information on Facebook. This tendency to share personal information may translate into
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entering credentials on a site found through a phishing email. Thus, there are conceivably other
personality traits that are more important for predicting phishing email susceptibility.
In addition to exploring these predictive relationships, future research should investigate
the nature of cyber-security compliance as it relates to phishing and spear-phishing email
detection. Further research into the nature of these compliance behaviors could provide insight
into the potential predictors of increased detection performance. For instance, if threat detection
performance is more closely related to task performance, research suggests that cognitive ability
may predict detection performance (Motowildo et al., 1997).
Implications
The primary implication of the ability to utilize SDT to model phishing detection is the
utility of the model for exploring the difference between how individuals actually perform with
regard to cyber-security compliance versus how they should perform. By calculating the payoffs
for difference decisions (according to the four stimulus response-pairs), organizations can
pinpoint an optimal criterion level. For instance, as aforementioned, cyber-security breaches
resulting from incorrectly responding to a phishing email (a miss in SDT) can be very costly to
organizations ($412,000 on average; Major, 2014) in terms of information loss, negative public
relations, and so forth. On the other hand, if an employee was very concerned about phishing
emails and responded cautiously (e.g. calling the sender in person) to every email, this would
undoubtedly hinder productivity. Furthermore, there are implications for the individual’s
perception of cost. Specifically, the weightless, abstract nature of data loss through security
breaches may cause employees to underestimate the cost of risky cyber-security behaviors. For
instance, when evaluating the cost of changing a password an employee might contemplate the
cost associated with the considerable time and effort needed to create and memorize a new
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password while largely ignoring the potential cost to the organization if inaction results in a data
breach.
Thus, it is important to compute the optimum criterion placement to minimize the costs
most important to the organization. Depending on which of the various costs (e.g., productivity,
possibility of cyber-breach, etc.) that the organization is interested in minimizing, there will be a
different minimum. Once this is computed, organizations will be able to determine how to
achieve that optimal level of performance. Specifically, organizations could approach this by
identifying individual characteristics that predict optimal performance either for selection
purposes or for identifying individual to take part in training interventions. Moreover, SDT can
be used to model improvements due to training interventions. Overall, SDT provides a powerful,
proven, empirical tool (Lord, 1985) that offers superior operationalization for phishing detection
performance and the ability to monitor improvements in accuracy.
More broadly, SDT has many implications for the field of I-O psychology. Researchers
and practitioners alike are interested in the measurement of accuracy. Whether it be accuracy in
performance appraisal ratings (Baker & Schuck, 1975) or the accuracy of ratings used for job
analysis (Lievens & Sanchez, 2007), or accuracy in detecting cyber-security threats in emails,
SDT offers is useful tool for operationalizing accuracy and/or performance through d′.
Furthermore, SDT could be applied to other topics relevant to the field of I-O psychology, such
as selection and training. Specifically, Stillman and Jackson (2005) use SDT to analyze TaskBased Assessment Center data to evaluate the reliability of checklist ratings. By using SDT, they
were able to not only judge the accuracy and reliability, but also demonstrate, through the use of
SDT’s bias measure, that checklist ratings tend to be lenient (Stillman & Jackson, 2005). This
bias estimate is an invaluable aspect of SDT that other strategies of measuring and evaluating
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accuracy and performance do not provide. Another potential application for SDT in the I-O field
is the use of the “utilized SDT” model (Lynn & Barrett, 2014), which utilizes economic concepts
to transform SDT into a predictive tool. This could be applied to the selection field where it
would model the perceptual uncertainty surrounding the weighing of scores on different selection
methods and the behavioral risk associated with choosing the wrong candidate.
Limitations
Though the present research addressed topics important for the growing interest in
elevating cyber-security in today’s increasingly connected society, it has several limitations.
First, this study relied on self-report for all the measures and participants could have been
inaccurate, inattentive, or misleading in their responses. Although an attention check was used,
there is no way to determine the extent to which participants could have been inaccurate, or
misleading in their responses. For instance, though the prompt asked how participants “would”
handle the email stimulus, participants may have responded with what they “should” do, which
would not accurately capture their veridical phishing and spear-phishing email detection
performance.
Secondly, payoff perceptions in this simulation likely do not mirror those in reality. It is
difficult to convey how much cost (behavioral risk) is associated with false alarms (responding to
an email as if it were threatening when it actually is not a threat). Specifically, the cost associated
with false alarms in the real world is principally time and productivity; however, in this
simulation, participants were likely not as concerned with those variables as they would be if it
were interfering with their actual work. Still, if this were the case, it is even more troubling how
poorly individuals performed in terms of detecting both the phishing and spear-phishing emails.
On average, participants detected about 7 out of the 10 phishing emails and only 4 out of the 10
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spear-phishing emails. That makes 9 successful attacks on the average participant. Since it only
takes one successful phishing attack to gain access to a system, this is very concerning!
Furthermore, the sample was MTurk workers who use HITs (human intelligence tasks), such as
surveys as a source of income; therefore, they may have been as concerned about time and
productivity as employees answering emails outside of a simulation setting.
Thirdly, though the base rate for threatening emails was lower than that of nonthreatening emails, it was likely much higher than the base rate for threatening emails in the
typical organization. For an analogue comparison of the impact of this disparity, research on
bomb screening at the airport shows that a low base rate can result in what is called the
prevalence effect and can greatly impact a person’s bias in decision-making (Wolfe et al., 2007).
Future research should examine the influence of different base rates on phishing email detection.
Finally, future research should explore the development of interventions in the form of
training programs for employees to increase their detection and appropriate response to cybersecurity threats. Specifically, the development of incentive programs that utilize SDT principles
could reduce the incidence of cyber-security breaches. Social engineering is a pervasive threat to
organizations, regardless of the development of new methods of cyber-attacks and cyber-security
defenses. Oftentimes, social engineering is the vehicle used to exploit vulnerabilities in a system.
Organizations must take the initiative to train individuals to be resistant to social engineering
tactics in order to properly defend themselves from costly attacks. More broadly, as a field
specializing in human decision-making and organizational efficiency, addressing the scarcity of
cyber-security research in the I-O Psychology literature is imperative because of the direct
implications for national security, organizations of all types, and the individuals they employ.
Conclusion
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The present study investigated the utility of signal detection theory as a method for
measuring and interpreting differences in phishing email susceptibility and spear-phishing email
susceptibility. A simulated inbox was used to measure phishing and spear-phishing susceptibility
within the SDT framework. Results indicated that SDT was a useful framework for modeling
decision-making regarding phishing and spear-phishing emails. Additionally, the present
research examined the relationship between conscientiousness and phishing spear-phishing email
susceptibility. Results indicated that conscientiousness is not a significant predictor of phishing
susceptibility. Future research should further investigate individual differences that predict
phishing susceptibility and investigate the utility of SDT for evaluating training effectiveness on
cyber-compliance behaviors.
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Tables
Table 2. Stimulus-Response Matrix
Stimulus

Response to prompt (“How would you handle this email?”)
Safe Behavior
Unsafe Behavior
S1 = No threat
False alarms
Correct rejections
(25.5)
(74.5)
S2 = Phishing email
Hits
Misses
(65.9)
(34.1)
Misses
S3 = Spear-phishing email Hits
(40.1)
(59.9)
Note. Values are in percentages and reflect the aggregate of responses across participants.
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Table 3. Frequency Stimulus-Response Table
Response
Safe Behavior
Unsafe Behavior
Total
"Sure"
"Unsure"
"Unsure"
"Sure"
No Threat
1232
874
1638
4536
8280
Phishing
1030
332
271
437
2070
Spear-phishing
504
325
371
870
2070
Note. N = 207. Participants made a binary detection response indicating “Option 1” for safe
behaviors and “Option 2” for unsafe behaviors. This response was immediately followed by a
confidence judgment. The participants’ confidence judgments were coded into sure and unsure
based on whether it fell above or below the participants’ mean confidence rating. Participants
with less than 60 responses for the confidence questions were excluded. The values in each cell
represent the number of responses for the stimulus-response pair.
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Table 4. Formulas for Calculation of SDT Statistics for Sample Participant
Formula (for Column B; Then copy to all other
columns)

A (Labels Only)
B (Part. 1)
1 # hits (S2)
5
2 # hits (S3)
3
3 # misses (S2)
5
4 # misses (S3)
7
5 # false alarms
8
6 # correct rejections
32
7 H1 (hit rate for S2)
0.500
=IF(B3>0, B1/(B1+B3),(B1 – 0.5)/(B1+B3))
8 H2 (hit rate for S3)
0.700
=IF(B4>0, B2/(B2+B4),(B2 – 0.5)/(B2+B4))
9 F (false alarm rate)
0.200
=IF(B5>0, B5/(B5+B6),0.5/(B5+B6))
10 z(H1)
0.000
=NORMSINV(B7)
11 z(H2)
0.524
=NORMSINV(B8)
12 z(F)
-0.842
=NORMSINV(B9)
13 d'(S1,S2)
0.842
=B10-B12
14 d'(S1,S3)
1.366
=B11-B12
15 d'(S2,S3)
0.524
=B14-B13
Note. The d′ values for different stimulus pairs (d'(S1,S3) and d'(S2,S3)) represent the end user’s
sensitivity for detecting the corresponding threat from the no threat condition, a higher value
indicates higher sensitivity. The d′ value in row 15 (d'(S2,S3)) represents the difference in enduser sensitivity between the spear-phishing and phishing email detection conditions.
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Table 5. Proportion of Trials on which the Stimulus Yielded Each Response

Safe Behavior
Unsafe Behavior
Total
"Sure"
"Unsure"
"Unsure"
"Sure"
No Threat
0.15
0.10
0.20
0.55
1.00
Phishing
0.50
0.16
0.13
0.21
1.00
Spear-phishing
0.24
0.16
0.18
0.42
1.00
Note. N = 208. Participants made a binary detection response indicating “Option 1” for safe
behaviors and “Option 2” for unsafe behaviors. This response was immediately followed by a
confidence judgment. The participants’ confidence judgments were coded into sure and unsure
based on whether it fell above or below the participants’ mean confidence rating. Participants
with less than 60 responses for the confidence questions were excluded. The values in each cell
represent the number of responses for the stimulus-response pair.
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Table 6. Hit and False-Alarm Rates: Cumulative Proportions

Safe Behavior
Unsafe Behavior
"Sure"
"Unsure"
"Unsure"
"Sure"
No Threat
0.15
0.25
0.45
1.00
Phishing
0.50
0.66
0.79
1.00
Spear-phishing
0.24
0.40
0.58
1.00
Note. N = 208. The values in each cell represent the cumulative frequencies of responses for the
stimulus-response pair.
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Table 7. Chi-Square Difference Test of Model Fit.
μ

σ

c1

c2

c3

χ2

df

p

Model 1: Full
Phishing
1.06 1.11
1.05
0.65
0.13
3.29
2
0.19
Spear-phishing
0.36 1.03
Model 2: Constrained
Phishing
.74 1.17
1.05
0.65
0.13
371.64
4
<.0001
Spear-phishing
.74 1.17
Model Comparison: Δ χ2
368.35
2
<.0001
Notes. μ = parameter mean estimate, σ = parameter standard deviation estimate, c1-3 = parameter criterion estimates.
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Table 8. Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis of Study Variables
M
35.27

SD
9.75

Skewness
1.04

Kurtosis
.78

2. Gender

1.50

.50

-.01

-2.01

3. Education

4.22

1.10

-.70

.26

36.09

17.30

1.47

3.20

4.69

1.97

-.05

-.88

6. Number of hours worked per week

38.70

9.01

-.44

2.46

7. Computer and Technology Skills

31.37

18.94

-.09

-.99

.61

.77

1.06

.38

9. Conscientiousness

78.74

15.16

-.56

-.34

10. Phishing Hit Rate

.63

.22

-.57

-.18

11. Spear-phishing Hit Rate

.41

.23

.46

-.70

12. False Alarm Rate

.27

.15

.81

1.06

1.10

.93

-.40

.11

.42

.86

.23

-.09

1. Age

4. Response Duration (in minutes)
5. Income

8. Computer Security Experience

13. Phishing Sensitivity: d'(S1,S2)
14. Spear-Phishing Sensitivity: d'(S1,S3)

.68
.64
-.32
-.11
15. Difference in sensitivity: d'(S2,S3)
Note. Number of hours worked per week does not include those that are unemployed. Gender is a
dichotomous variable.
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Table 9. Correlations among Study Variables.
1
1. Age
2. Gender
-0.23***
3. Education
-0.04
4. Response Duration (in minutes)
0.20***
5. Income
0.05
6. Number of hours worked
0.03
7. Computer and Technology Skills
-0.07
8. Computer Security Experience
-0.04
9. Conscientiousness
0.16**
10. Phishing Hit Rate
0.06
11. Spear-phishing Hit Rate
-0.04
12. False Alarm Rate
-0.05
13. Phishing Sensitivity: d'(S1,S2)
0.06
14. Spear-Phishing Sensitivity: d'(S1,S3) -0.02
15. Difference in sensitivity: d'(S2,S3)
0.10
Notes. N = 234-282. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

2

3

4

5

6

-0.03
0.00
-0.09
0.10
0.15**
0.13
-0.14*
0.12*
0.16**
0.04
0.08
0.12*
-0.04

-0.06
0.21*
0.10
0.22***
0.05
-0.13*
-0.04
-0.02
-0.09
0.03
0.04
-0.01

-0.06
-0.07
-0.05
0.05
-0.04
0.02
-0.02
-0.06
0.05
0.01
0.05

0.20**
0.35***
0.09
0.07
0.06
0.09
-0.07
0.08
0.12*
-0.05

0.17**
0.01
0.05
0.15*
0.15*
0.02
0.11
0.11
0.01
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Table 9, continued. Correlations among Study Variables
7
1. Age
2. Gender
3. Education
4. Response Duration (in minutes)
5. Income
6. Number of hours worked
7. Computer and Technology Skills
8. Computer Security Experience
0.29**
9. Conscientiousness
-0.02
10. Phishing Hit Rate
0.04
11. Spear-phishing Hit Rate
0.02
12. False Alarm Rate
-0.06
13. Phishing Detection
0.06
14. Spear-Phishing Detection
0.04
15. Difference in detection ability
0.04
Notes. N = 234-282. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

8

9

10

11

12

0.07
0.17*
0.07
-0.13*
0.19**
0.14*
0.09

-0.04
-0.05
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
0.00

0.56***
-0.20*
0.85***
0.58***
0.45***

0.02
0.43***
0.80***
-0.46***

-0.67*** -0.56*** 0.75***
-0.23*** 0.44***
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13

14

15

-0.26*** -

Table 10. Regression Results

Model
Step 1: Controls
Gender
Income
Computer Security Experience
Step 1 R2

Outcome
Phishing Detection Spear-Phishing Detection
.06
.07
.20**
.05

.11
.12*
.13*
.05

Step 2: Direct Effects
Gender
.06
.11
Income
.07
.12*
Computer Security Experience .20**
.13*
Conscientiousness
-.03
-.03
Total F
3.636**
3.205*
2
.05
.05
Total R
Δ R2
.00
.00
Notes. N = 234-282. *p<.05, **p<.01. Standardized estimates.
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Figures

Figure 3. ROCs for Group-level Phishing and Spear-phishing Email Sensitivity Prediction, the
full model.
Note. This graph plots the false alarm rates for the non-threatening email stimuli and the hit rates
for each the spear-phishing and phishing email stimuli. The blue dots indicate the observed
spear-phishing email hit rate and false alarm points while the red dots indicate the observed
phishing email hit rate and false alarm points. The dotted lines indicate the fitted ROC curve for
the best-fitting signal detection theory parameters. The spear-phishing ROC is also closer to the
chance line, indicating that participants were more sensitive to phishing emails.
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Figure 4. ROCs for Group-level Phishing and Spear-phishing Email Sensitivity Prediction, the
constrained model.
Note. This graph plots the false alarm rates for the non-threatening email stimuli and the hit rates
for each the spear-phishing and phishing email stimuli. The blue dots indicate the observed
phishing email hit rate and false alarm points while the red indicated the observed spear-phishing
email hit rate and false alarm points. The dotted lines indicate the fitted ROC curve for the bestfitting signal detection theory parameters. In this constrained model, the means are constrained
equal so the parameter estimates are the same. These SDT parameters, where the means are
constrained to be equal, do not fit the observed data; χ2(4) = 371.64, p<.0001.
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Appendix A: Conscientiousness Scale
On the following page, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the
rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as
you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see
yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same
age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in
absolute confidence. Please read each statement carefully, and then select an option on the scale.
Response Options: 1 = “Very Inaccurate”; 2 = “Moderately Inaccurate”; 3 = “Neither Inaccurate
nor Accurate”; 4 = “Moderately Accurate”; 5 = “Very Accurate”
1. Am always prepared.
2. Pay attention to details.
3. Get chores done right away.
4. Carry out my plans.
5. Make plans and stick to them.
6. Complete tasks successfully.
7. Do things according to a plan.
8. Am exacting in my work.
9. Finish what I start.
10. Follow through with my plans.
11. Waste my time.
12. Find it difficult to get down to work.
13. Do just enough work to get by.
14. Don't see things through.
15. Shirk my duties.
16. Mess things up.
17. Leave things unfinished.
18. Don't put my mind on the task at hand.
19. Make a mess of things.
20. Need a push to get started.
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Appendix B: Demographic Questions
Please indicate your highest level of education
Some high school
High school diploma/GED
Some college
Trade/technical/vocational training
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Professional degree
Doctoral degree
Do you have any education in computer security?
Yes
No
If yes, what type of education (certification, bachelor’s, etc.)? ________
Do you hold a job involving computer security?
Yes
No
If yes, what is the job title? ______
Have you held a job involving computer security?
Yes
No
If yes, what was the job title? ______
Have you ever helped someone fix a computer problem?
Yes
No
If yes, what assistance did you provide? ________
What is your gender?
Male
Female
What is your age (in years)? _____
On average, how many hours do you work per week? __________
What is your job title? Select*
(*this response option branches through job trees from O*NET classification)
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Appendix C: Phishing email examples
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Appendix D: Spear-phishing examples
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Appendix E: Prompt
Please read the following scenario in order to familiarize yourself with your role for this study.
You are a recruiter, named Jordan Smith, for a small government contracting company called
FinanceGurus. Your role involves finding, corresponding with, and evaluating incoming talent,
managing the LinkedIn, Taleo, and Monster profiles for the company, and coordinating with the
other Human Resources personnel (Chloe) and external hiring services (e.g. Scout, Happie). You
are also involved in some administrative work (e.g. company shipping) since it’s a small
company. Currently, you’re sourcing for a candidate for a Senior Accountant position, a
SharePoint position and Senior Financial Specialist position. Please read through the following
60 emails and, based on the given information, evaluate the top candidates to suggest to the HR
lead, Casey Johnson, for hire.
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Appendix F: IRB Approval Letter

January 3, 2017
Jaclyn Martin Psychology Tampa, FL 33612
RE: Exempt Certification IRB#: Pro00025966 Title: Computer Behavior at Work
Dear Ms. Martin:
On 1/3/2017, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria for
exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b):
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey
procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is
recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to
the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could
reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial
standing, employability, or reputation.
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in the
Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.
Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the application is closed
in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that was previously declared exempt
from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation of the change. However,
administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not warrant an amendment or new
application.
Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does not limit your
ability to conduct your research project.
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University of South
Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions
regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,

Kristen Salomon, Ph.D., Vice Chairperson USF Institutional Review Board
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